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Legislative Atrophy 
Jesse Panuccio*
The country is sharply divided over President Obama’s policies. But 
whether you celebrate or lament these policies, one thing is certain: Mr. 
Obama has been one of the most effective presidents in history at making 
his agenda a reality. At the end of his eight years, he’ll have left almost 
nothing on the table. On just about every domestic and foreign-policy front 
he has moved the needle significantly to the left. Yet, despite this policy 
success, the Obama administration’s legislative accomplishments are 
relatively few. President Obama cannot boast the legislative record of 
Franklin Roosevelt or Lyndon Johnson, who ushered in the New Deal and 
Great Society programs through hard-fought battles in Congress. And even 
with respect to President Obama’s one major legislative accomplishment—
the Affordable Care Act—the actual text of the law has, in practice, had 
only a loose relationship with the implementation of healthcare policy since 
its enactment.1
How can it be that President Obama has accomplished so much from a 
policy perspective while accomplishing so little in Congress? The answer, 
of course, is that he has done it all through various forms of executive 
action—from outright decrees, to rulemaking, to non-enforcement of 
existing laws, to litigation positions. The Obama administration has gone 
further than any in history in making policy through through executive fiat. 
President Nixon may have once famously said, “when the president does it, 
that means that it is not illegal,”2 but it is President Obama who has actually 
governed according to that creed. 
Professors, pundits, and politicians have now spent several years 
debating President Obama’s various uses (or misuses) of executive power—
important and interesting debates, as highlighted by this symposium. But in 
addition to debating the legality of these actions, we must also ask another 
critical question: How is it that we’ve gotten to this point? How is it that the 
       * I am grateful to the FIU Law Review for the invitation to present at this symposium, and for its 
editors’ work on this comment. I delivered a version of these remarks at the Federalist Society’s Florida 
Chapters Conference on February 28, 2015. See 2015 Florida Chapters Conference, FEDERALIST
SOC’Y, www.fed-soc.org/events/detail/2015-florida-chapters-conference (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
1  Professor Blackman, in his presentation, laid out the many ways in which the Obama 
administration has ignored the plain text of the Affordable Care Act. See Josh Blackman, Government
by Blog Post, 11 FIU L. Rev. 389 (2016). 
2  Interview by David Frost with Richard Nixon, Former President, United States of America, in 
Monarch Bay, Cal. (Mar.–Apr. 1977), http://landmarkcases.org/en/Page/722/Nixons_Views_on_Presi
dential_Power_ Excerpts_from_a_1977_Interview_with_David_Frost. 
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American people and their governing institutions have largely come to 
accept an executive that acts unilaterally? The answer, I think, is that 
President Obama’s assertions of executive power are merely the coup de 
grace on a long period of legislative atrophy.3
To appreciate just how far we’ve come, recall the founding 
generation’s views on the separation of powers. James Madison, famously 
noting in Federalist 51 that men are not angels, explained, “In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”4 Madison 
continued, “a dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on 
the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of 
auxiliary precautions.”5 These auxiliary precautions are found in the 
structural provisions of the Constitution—the vertical and horizontal 
separation of powers. With respect to the latter, the founders hewed to the 
theory first espoused by Aristotle, who said in his Politics that the 
deliberative branch of government is “the supreme element.”6 Echoing this 
in Federalist 51, Madison wrote, “In republican government, the legislative 
authority necessarily predominates.”7 Accordingly, as Madison explained in 
Federalist 48, “it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that 
the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their 
precautions.”8 Acting on this belief, the founders wrote a constitution in 
which the first article (establishing Congress) is much more finely wrought 
than, and is more than double the length of, the second article (establishing 
the presidency). The founders viewed the legislative branch—with the 
power to make policy—as first among equals, and thus much more 
carefully cabined that branch through structural protections. 
But who could possibly think of Congress as predominant today? Our 
modern system is one of executive predominance—an “Imperial 
Presidency” as Arthur Schlesinger famously put it9—with power slowly 
accreted over time. From healthcare, to immigration, to drug policy, to the 
environment, to fiscal policy, to energy—no one really asks what Congress 
is doing. All that matters is what the federal agencies are doing. There are 
3  Two scholars have recently published excellent, longer treatments of this topic. See Charles J. 
Cooper, Confronting the Administrative State, 25 NAT’L AFF. 96 (2015); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014). 
4    THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
5     Id.
6    ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. IV, at 179 (H.W.C. Davis, ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Oxford at the 
Clarendon Press 1908) (c. 385 B.C.E.).
7    THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
8    THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added). 
9  ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). 
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many explanations for this—sociological, historical, economic10—but from 
a legal perspective, legislative atrophy flows from several doctrines that 
radically depart from the founding vision. 
First, the federal courts long ago gutted the non-delegation principle, 
which holds that Congress cannot grant legislative power to the executive 
branch. The abandonment of this precept means that it is acceptable for 
Congress to empower federal agencies with vast amounts of regulatory 
authority and very little guidance. For example, it is acceptable, the 
Supreme Court has held, for Congress to authorize an agency to pass 
regulations on a topic in a way that is, simply, “requisite to protect public 
health.”11 With this leeway, Congress has over time delegated ever more 
policymaking work to administrative agencies, with ever broader grants of 
power. Why take on the politically difficult work of policymaking when it 
can be sloughed off on others? 
Second, under the Chevron doctrine, if there is a “legislative 
delegation to an agency on a particular question,” then federal courts are to 
defer to the “agency’s construction of the statute which it administers.”12
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently held that courts must defer to 
agencies on the very question of whether Congress has, in fact, delegated 
power.13 Thus, not only can agencies make policy with a relatively free 
hand, they can determine whether Congress has given them that free hand. 
Third, agencies adjudicate cases that arise under the statutes they 
administer.14 In other words, an agency can make policy, enforce that 
policy, and then adjudicate the claim of an affected party who might 
challenge that enforcement action. Indeed, the Supreme Court has even held 
that, in some cases, agencies can adjudicate claims that arise under the 
organic law of states, rather than under federal statutes committed to the 
agencies’ administration.15
In modern American government, then, most law is made, executed, 
and adjudicated by administrative agencies. What might the founders have 
thought of this situation? Well, in Federalist No. 47, Madison told us 
precisely: “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and 
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether 
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very 
10 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 3, at 99–100 (describing Woodrow Wilson’s policy arguments 
in favor of unifying power in technocratic experts); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 
1223 n.6 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (same).
11  Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001). 
12  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
13  City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
14 See Den, ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855)
(holding that “matters[] involving public rights” may be adjudicated by agencies). 
15 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
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definition of tyranny.”16
Some justices currently on the Supreme Court have raised concerns 
over just how far aspects of the administrative state have strayed from the 
founding plan. Indeed, in a concurring opinion in a 2015 case, Justice 
Thomas called for a wholesale reworking of the Court’s non-delegation 
doctrine: “[T]he test we have applied to distinguish legislative from 
executive power largely abdicates our duty to enforce that prohibition. . . . I 
would return to the original understanding of the federal legislative power 
and require that the Federal Government create generally applicable rules of 
private conduct only through the constitutionally prescribed legislative 
process.”17 In other words, Justice Thomas would require Congress to get 
back into the game of policymaking.  
As for deference to administrative agencies, cracks are starting to 
show. In City of Arlington v. FCC, a 2013 case, Chief Justice Roberts—
joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito—took the position that, in allowing 
agencies to determine for themselves whether Congress had conferred to 
them interpretive authority over a particular issue, the Court’s 
administrative deference has gone too far. The Chief Justice quoted 
Madison’s caution against tyranny and bemoaned “the danger posed by the 
growing power of the administrative state.”18 The Chief Justice lamented 
that “as a practical matter [administrative agencies] exercise legislative 
power, . . . executive power, . . . and judicial power . . . ,” and that “[t]he 
accumulation of these powers in the same hands is not an occasional or 
isolated exception to the constitutional plan; it is a central feature of modern 
American government.”19 In another case, Michigan v. EPA, Justice 
Thomas went even further. He criticized not just aspects of the Chevron
doctrine, but “raise[d] serious questions about the constitutionality” of “the 
broader practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes.”20
Of course, “Justice Thomas’s views do not command a majority of the 
Court—or anywhere close to a majority. And it is highly unlikely . . . that 
the Court will ever be composed of five originalists like Thomas.”21 So the 
administrative state will march on—unchecked by the federal courts, at 
least.
And the vast administrative state grows vaster by the day.  How much 
policymaking is being done by agencies? Well, in 2013 and 2014, federal 
16    THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
17  Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. RRs, 135 S. Ct. 1225, (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment).
18 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 1877–78. 
20   Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
21  Cooper, supra note 3, at 108. 
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agencies promulgated 7,213 new regulations while Congress enacted only 
296 new laws—twenty-four regulations for every law, and about ten new 
regulations per day.22 In terms of cost, “[b]y the [Obama] administration’s 
own estimates, the rules it issued in [fiscal year] 2012 alone imposed more 
costs on the economy than all the rules issued during the entire first terms 
of Presidents Bush and Clinton, combined.”23 As Chief Justice Roberts put 
it in his City of Arlington dissent, “hundreds of federal agencies [are] 
poking into every nook and cranny of daily life,” and “the citizen 
confronting thousands of pages of regulations . . . can perhaps be excused 
for thinking that it is the agency really doing the legislating.”24
These numbers highlight another problem with the system we’ve 
created: the administrative state is so vast, and the civil service laws so 
protective of the employees who staff it, that there are few, if any, checks 
on much of the work of the modern executive branch.25 The one elected and 
accountable official in the executive branch—the President—is often unable 
to truly control the expansive powers that the legislative branch has ceded 
to federal agencies. We are governed not by the tyranny of an elected 
president, but by the unchecked discretion of an unelected class of 
permanent government officials. The courtiers, and not the king, hold much 
of the power in the modern federal government. 
The inability of the President to control the executive branch is not just 
a matter of scope—it, too, is a matter of legal doctrine that perverts the 
founding scheme. Under Humphrey’s Executor, Congress may establish 
“independent” agencies that do not answer directly to the President. As the 
Court put it, “[t]he authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or 
quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties 
22  Competitive Enterprise Institute, Ten Thousand Commandments 2014, https://cei.org/studies/
ten-thousand-commandments-2014; Competitive Enterprise Institute, Ten Thousand Commandments 
2015, https://cei.org/10kc2015. 
23 SUSAN E. DUDLEY, REGULATORY STUD. CTR., GEO. WASH. UNIV., COSTS OF NEW
REGULATIONS ISSUED IN 2012 DWARF THOSE OF PREVIOUS YEARS, ACCORDING TO OMB REPORT 1 
(Apr. 22, 2013), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/20130422_OMB_Report.
pdf. The economic costs of all of this regulation are of great concern. Even more concerning are the 
criminal penalties that attach to this continuing onslaught of federal regulation. “There are . . . hundreds 
of thousands of federal regulations that can be criminally enforced. . . . In fact, most Americans are 
criminals and don’t know it . . . .” Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal 
Criminal, in IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE 44 (2009).
24 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1879 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
25 See id. at 1878 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“‘[N]o President (or his executive office staff) 
could, and presumably none would wish to, supervise so broad a swath of regulatory activity.’”) 
(quoting Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2250 (2001)); Daniel 
Foster, One-Party Taxmen, NAT’L REV. (July 1, 2013), at 18, www.nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/
350943/one-party-taxmen (“[W]e are in large part governed by a politically insulated fourth branch of 
government . . . in war and peace, boom and recession, no matter who controls the Congress, the Courts, 
or the White House.”). 
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independently of executive control cannot well be doubted . . . .”26 Well, 
perhaps to the progressive eye of 1935, but to the founding eye of 1789 
some doubt may have crept in.27
Combining these doctrinal developments—abandonment of non-
delegation, extreme deference to agency interpretations, and establishment 
of independent agencies—the situation is a follows: Congress can delegate 
policymaking of any kind to an executive agency, the agency can interpret 
the scope of its own authority under that delegation without much 
interference from the courts, and the President can be completely walled off 
from that agency’s decisionmaking. 
For a jarring example of what this means in practice, consider a few 
facts from a major policy shift that occurred during President Obama’s 
administration. First, in announcing his support for a policy of so-called net 
neutrality among Internet providers, President Obama in October 2014 said, 
“My appointee [at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)], Tom 
Wheeler, knows my position. Now that he’s there, I can’t just call him up 
and tell him exactly what to do.”28 Second, in advance of the FCC’s vote on 
Internet regulation in March 2015, Chairman Wheeler refused to testify 
before Congress.29 Third, the FCC, in fact, voted to regulate the Internet as 
a public utility. 
Think about how perverse this situation is, at least from the 
perspective of the founders. Why in the world is an executive branch 
agency making the economy-altering, profound policy decision of how the 
Internet should be defined and governed? Aren’t major policy decisions like 
this precisely the province of elected representatives in Congress? And even 
if it were appropriate for the executive branch to make this decision, how 
can it be that the President of the United States is reduced to lobbying his 
own appointees regarding what moves to make? To whom are Chairman 
Wheeler and his fellow commissioners accountable? Who elected them? To 
whom do they answer if the electorate cannot reach them, the President 
26  Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 US 602, 629 (1935). 
27 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he 
executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate.”); THE FEDERALIST NO.
70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Energy in the executive is a leading character in 
the definition of good government. . . . The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are   . . . 
unity . . . duration . . . an adequate provision for its support[, and] competent powers. . . . That unity is 
conducive to energy will not be disputed. . . . This unity may be destroyed . . . by vesting the power . . . 
ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and co-operation of others, in the 
capacity of counselors to him.”). 
28 Andy Kessler, The Department of the Internet, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2014, 7:29 PM), 
www.wsj.com/articles/andy-kessler-the-department-of-the-internet-1415665771. 
29 Andrew Johnson, FCC Chair Refuses to Testify Before Congress Ahead of Net Neutrality 
Vote, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 25, 2015, 10:19 AM), www.nationalreview.com/corner/414380/fcc-chair-refuses-
testify-congress-ahead-net-neutrality-vote-andrew-johnson.
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cannot control them, and Congress cannot even get them to testify? 
Reasonable people can differ on the substance of the FCC’s Internet 
regulations, but it is hard to see how any American who believes in 
representative democracy and the importance of separation of powers can 
believe that it is healthy or constitutional for the FCC to be able make this 
important policy decision without accountability to either Congress or the 
President.
The issue here—the question of whether certain functions are properly 
delegated by Congress to the executive branch—is not the same as the 
question of whether the Obama administration is exceeding even 
Congress’s capacious delegations of policymaking power. The question is 
whether the actual delegations Congress has made to the executive in the 
last century are a perversion of the founding principles and an abdication of 
Congress’s duty to make policy. The question is whether our entire 
administrative state is sufficiently protective of liberty and faithful to the 
founder’s constitutional scheme. As Professor Hamburger recently put it, 
the current administrative state “systematically steps outside the 
Constitution’s structures, thereby creating an entire anti-constitutional 
regime.”30
So, yes, as others have pointed out during this symposium, President 
Obama has taken to acting without statutory authority or in direct 
contravention of clear statutory language. In so doing, consistently and 
without hesitation, President Obama has pushed executive power further 
than any president in history.  His answer to any question of executive 
authority has been “yes we can.”  But once we have gone as far as we have 
in delegation and deference to the executive—once we have spent a century 
acclimating ourselves legislative atrophy and a government that is largely 
dominated by executive-branch policymaking—is it really such a far leap 
for the executive to simply start acting without, or in direct contravention 
of, statutory law?31 No other institution of government is acting to stop the 
aggrandizement of power, the people are not revolting against it, and the 
media refuses to police it. Montesquieu once said, “Political liberty . . . is 
present only when power is not abused, but it has been eternally observed 
that any man who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until he finds 
limits. Who would think it! Even virtue has need of limits.”32 In modern 
times, we might say that even “hope and change” have need of limits. But if 
30  Hamburger, supra note 3, at 498. 
31  As Justice Thomas put it in his opinion in Michigan v. EPA: “Although we hold today that 
EPA exceeded even the extremely permissive limits on agency power set by our precedents, we should 
be alarmed that it felt sufficiently emboldened by those precedents to make the bid for deference that it 
did here.” Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
32  MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, 155 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller & 
Harold S. Stone eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989). 
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no one will set limits, we cannot expect a president to set them for himself. 
As Madison warned us, presidents are men, not angels, and we must “oblige 
[government] to control itself.”33
The question, then, is whether there are still limits we can place on the 
executive branch. Is it even possible in our globalized and highly 
technologized world to have a government that makes most decisions 
through the quaint, slow, and often cumbersome institution of Congress? I 
think the answer is yes. I think it is possible for the legislative branch to 
retake control, to legislate more carefully, with tighter delegations, and to 
more closely monitor and refine what agencies are doing. I think this is 
possible because it is exactly what happens here in the home state of this 
law review—Florida. 
As a doctrinal matter, the Florida Supreme Court has been more 
willing than the United States Supreme Court to invalidate delegations as 
overly broad. The court has “expressly and repeatedly rejected whatever 
federal doctrine can be said to exist regarding nondelegation” and held that 
the “far-ranging administrative powers tolerated in the federal system are 
contrary to the fundamental philosophy underlying American 
government.”34 Thus, few, if any, statutes in Florida grant agencies the 
broad discretion afforded federal agencies. Yet the government still 
manages to function. 
Doctrine, however, is just words on a page. The real check on 
administrative power in Florida is that the legislature takes its role 
seriously. It crafts very detailed legislation and it revisits that legislation 
when it feels an agency has gone astray or a new regulatory issue has 
arisen. Moreover, the Florida Legislature created the Administrative 
Procedures Committee, which examines every agency rule for consistency 
with statute.35 If the committee objects to a rule, and the agency fails to 
respond, the rule is deemed withdrawn. If the agency chooses not to amend 
and so notifies the committee, the full legislature is put on notice of the 
disagreement so that it can take corrective action if desired. 
33 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
34  B.H. v. State of Florida, 645 So. 2d 987, 991–92 (Fla. 1994). This is not to say the Florida 
Supreme Court is paragon of virtue when it comes to all aspects of the separation of powers, especially 
in recent years. Two extreme examples from 2011 suffice to make the point. In one case, the Court 
created Humphrey’s Executor on steroids, by holding that the governor cannot control administrative 
rulemaking of agencies headed by officials who serve at his pleasure. See Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 
(Fla. 2011). In another case (one of many), the Florida Supreme Court has aggrandized the legislative 
policymaking power to itself. See, e.g., Pino v. Bank of N.Y., 76 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2011) (retaining 
jurisdiction over a case settled by the parties because the issue “transcend[ed] the individual parties” and 
was “one of great public importance and in need of resolution”). 
35 See FLA. STAT. § 120.545 (2016).
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This is not the place for a full exposition of administrative law and 
practice in Florida, but the example of the country’s third most populous 
state demonstrates that legislative work can still be done by the legislature, 
even in our modern and complex society. One might argue that the federal 
government covers too much ground for this kind of close, frequent work 
by the legislative branch. But that is not an argument for abandoning the 
horizontal separation of powers. Instead, it is a point in favor of 
reinvigorating the other major separation-of-powers principle that the 
founders put in place: federalism. If Congress cannot actively engage in all 
that is going on at the federal level, then too much policymaking is being 
done at the federal level.36 More policymaking needs to be left to the states 
if that is the only place where legislative predominance—that is, 
representative democracy and its attendant liberty—can properly function. 
36  Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1252 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“I accept that this would inhibit the Government from acting with the speed and efficiency 
Congress has sometimes found desirable.”). 
